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UNITED STA TES V PA YNER: CLOSING A LOOPHOLE IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
STANDING REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is restricted by a standing re-
quirement. Evidence which results from an illegal search or seizure cannot
be suppressed unless the constitutional rights violated are the defendant's;
violation of a third party's rights is insufficient.I In United States v. Payner,2 a
majority of the Supreme Court adhered to this requirement of standing even
though: (1) the Government's search and seizure clearly violated the fourth
amendment 3 and, under state law, probably constituted the crime of lar-
ceny; 4 (2) the Government was aware its action would violate state law and
the United States Constitution;5 (3) the Government's illegal search and
seizure was for the relatively insignificant purpose of gathering information
about suspected tax evasion;6 and (4) the Government deliberately circum-
vented the exclusionary rule by apparently instructing its agents to select
their victims prudently.
7
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suspected in 1972 that American
taxpayers were illegally concealing funds in the Bahamas. 8 As part of its
investigation, the IRS devised a scheme to relieve a visiting Bahamian bank
vice president of the contents of his briefcase. 9 The IRS correctly theorized
that the briefcase's contents would lead to the names of Americans holding
Bahamian bank accounts not disclosed on their tax returns.10 A woman was
paid $1,000 to go out to dinner with the bank officer, who left the briefcase
at her apartment."t A paid informant and an IRS special agent entered the
apartment with a key the woman had provided and removed the briefcase. '
2
1. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44 (1943); Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. L. REv. 493 (1952).
2. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 447 U.S. at 747 n. 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F.
Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977)).
5. 447 U.S. at 742.
6. Id. at 728.
7. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113
(N.D. Ohio 1977)).
8. 447 U.S. at 738 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 738-40. Justice Marshall implied that the $1,000 paid to the woman may have
been in part "for what occurred in the [woman's] apartment prior to the couple's departure for
dinner." Id. at 740 n.4.
12. Id. at 740-41. The IRS had earlier referred the special agent to a locksmith who made
a key to fit the briefcase lock. Id.
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IRS photography experts copied the contents, and the special agent replaced
the briefcase. The district court found that the operation, entirely approved
of by IRS supervisors, 13 "appear[ed] to satisfy a prima facie case of larceny
under Florida law."'
4
Jack Payner was subsequently indicted.1 5 The district court suppressed
the fruit of the illegal search and seizure, without which the Government
could not prove Payner "knowingly and willfully '" 6 falsified his tax return.
The district court recognized that Payner lacked standing to invoke the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.17 The suppression order was based in-
stead on fifth amendment due process' 8 and on the federal courts' inherent
supervisory power.' 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the supervisory power alone.20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the supervisory power and fifth amendment due process could not sub-
stitute for fourth amendment standing.2 1 This comment, like the Supreme
Court opinion and the opinion for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, will
largely ignore Payner's fifth amendment implications 2 2 and will focus on the
case's significance as a barometer of the interplay between the exclusionary
rule standing requirement and the supervisory power of the federal courts.
The merits of the exclusionary rule itself will be discussed only to the extent
those merits are relevant to the supervisory power and to standing.
13. Id. at 739.
14. Id. at 746-47 n.12 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio
1977)).
15. Jack Payner was one of those Americans who had not disclosed his Bahamian bank
account. Documents in the briefcase revealed a close association between the bank officer's
Bahamian bank and a Florida bank. Subpoenas issued to the Florida bank uncovered a loan
agreement in which Payner had pledged as security his funds in the Bahamian bank. Payner,
however, had stated on his tax return that he did not have a foreign bank account.
The indictment charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) which provides that
"[wihoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . . .
shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 447
U.S. at 728.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
17. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affdper curnam,
590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
18. The district court's fifth amendment argument was unprecedented. It stated flatly that
"[t]here is no standing problem in this case in regard to the Fifth Amendment Due Process
question." 434 F. Supp. at 129 n.65. Apparently standing was not a problem for the district
court because it believed that "the Court must furnish those persons who are the ultimate
targets with standing to raise the exclusionary rule in order to insure that some party is avail-
able to litigate the question of the Government's outrageously unconstitutional activity." The
defendant cannot invoke the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, however, so there is no rea-
son that he should be able to invoke a fifth amendment exclusionary rule since the policies
underlying both considerations presumably are identical. The district court implicitly acknowl-
edged that the purpose of its newborn fifth amendment exclusionary rule would be identical to
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule's purpose: deterrence. The court quoted extensively
from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, however, standing was not at issue.
19. 434 F. Supp. at 126-36.
20. United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
21. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
22. Set note 18 sqpra.
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I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE STANDING REQUIREMENT
In Jones v. United States,23 a narcotics case, the Court held that the de-
fendant had standing to object to evidence resulting from an illegal search,
even though the premises searched were not his, because he was legitimately
on the illegally searched premises.24 Jones represents the broadest reading of
the Court's general rule that fourth amendment rights are personal rights
that cannot be vicariously asserted, a rule later reaffirmed in Alderman v.
United States .25
The Alderman-Jones test of standing continued substantially intact until
Rakas v. Illinois.26 Justice Rehnquist's Rakas opinion replaced the legiti-
mately-on-the-premises test with the narrower test of whether the search and
seizure "infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect. '2 7 The question ultimately may be whether
the search offended the defendant's expectation of privacy. 28
In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist significantly changed the standing question
terminology, though, as he admits, probably not its substance.2 9 He pointed
out that standing, strictly speaking, relates to the concern that issues be
sharply focused by adversary proceedings. 30 The adversarial relationship be-
tween the defendant and the prosecution is ordinarily sufficient to contest
thoroughly the issue of whether there was an illegal search and seizure, be-
cause the defendant's liberty is likely at stake. The new terminology offered
in Rakas is that the search and seizure must have violated the defendant's
fourth amendment rights in order to avail him of the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule.
3 1
II. THE MEANING OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER
In its broadest sense, the supervisory power may be described as the
23. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overuled in part, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and in part,
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). See note 27 znfa and accompanying text.
24. 362 U.S. at 264.
25. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
26. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
27. Id. at 140. Rakas thus restricted one of the alternate holdings ofjones. The otherjones
holding was that the defendant had "automatic" standing where the possession required for
standing was the possession needed to establish an element of the offense charged. Automatic
standing was to prevent the government from contending that the defendant lacked the requi-
site possession for purposes of exclusionary rule standing, yet had possession for purposes of the
offense charged. Justice Rehnquist questioned whether the/onts rule of automatic standing still
lived. Id. at 135 n.4. Two days after Payner, the Court overruled theJones rule of automatic
standing. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
28. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
The defendant in Payner lacked standing because he had no "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in his Bahamian bank account. 447 U.S. at 732 n.4 (citing United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976)). The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Bahamian bank laws pro-
duced an expectation of privacy not present in Miller. Id.
29. 439 U.S. at 139-40.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
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federal courts' general power to supervise the administration of justice.3 2
Confusion arises, however, regarding the extent to which the power may be
exercised when courts parrot this vague description as if it were a definition.
Cases in which courts have wielded the power may be classified into four
categories.3 3 First, an appellate court occasionally will overturn a lower
court decision for prejudicial error but inexplicably contend it is exercising
its supervisory power.3 4 The resulting confusion is needless. An appellate
court surely can perform its primary function of review without conjuring up
apparitions like the supervisory power.
In a second group of cases courts have employed the supervisory power
to fashion rules for improving the quality of the judicial process.3 5 The aim
here is to foster fair and proper adjudication. The evolution of rules of evi-
dence is an example. Although the Constitution dictates a floor of minimum
safeguards beneath which the court shall not descend, the judicially devel-
oped rules of evidence are far above that minimum. Rules designed to im-
prove the judicial process normally do not define substantive rights. Instead,
they specify the procedure that experience has proven is most likely to pro-
duce accurate determinations. This second group of cases exemplifies what
may be dubbed procedural supervisory power.
The third set of cases deals with enforcement of constitutional provi-
sions.3 6 Some proscriptions in the Constitution are mere "thou shalt nots"
which fail to include an effective set of subsidiary rules to implement the
commandment. The fourth amendment is notorious in this regard.3 7 It is
important to distinguish those cases in which the rule asserted by use of the
supervisory power is itself a fundamental constitutional right from those
cases in which the rule asserted by use of the supervisory power is merely a
means to protect a fundamental constitutional right. The holdings of those
cases in which the rule itself is a constitutional right can be said to flow
directly from the Constitution. They are not exercises of the supervisory
power but are simply constitutional interpretations. Due process and free-
dom of speech cases are outstanding examples. The holdings of those cases
in which the rule is a means to protect a constitutional right are legitimate
exercises of the supervisory power. They are the substantive analogue to the
procedural supervisory power used in connection with improving the judi-
32. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
33. The last three of these four categories are similar, but not identical, to the three catego-
ries described in Hill, The Bill of Rights andthe Supervisogy Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193-94
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
34. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, reo'don rehear'ng, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.
1973). In Burton, the appellate court initially reversed and remanded after finding prejudicial
error. Needlessly, it rested its decision to reverse on the supervisory power, not on its general
power to reverse for prejudicial error.
35. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (exclusion of confessions obtained
under duress); Hill, supra note 33, at 194-96, and cases cited therein.
36. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (enforcement of wiretapping stat-
ute); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (enforcement of fourth amendment prohibi-
tion against illegal searches and seizures); Hill, supra note 33, at 198-99.
37. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: 7he Exchsonaqy Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 621, 643-44.
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cial process.
38
Procedural supervisory power designs rules to achieve the goal of fair
and proper adjudication. Substantive supervisory power designs rules to
achieve the goal of enforcing the spirit of the Constitution. The key point is
that supervisory power, both procedural and substantive, is the basis for
rules of law that are not constitutionally mandated. Therefore, unlike rules
of constitutional interpretation, any supervisory power rule may be replaced
or eliminated. Because the supervisory power rules are the prophylaxes for
constitutional rights, not sacrosanct themselves, the courts should mold them
freely as conditions change and needs arise. Unfortunately, they are often
confused with the rules that are constitutionally mandated.
Confusing constitutional interpretation with the supervisory power does
not necessarily delay the development of constitutional law, but it does mis-
label the court's action. The effect of this mislabeling is that a rule based on
the supervisory power mistakenly becomes elevated to a rule of constitu-
tional law. Because courts are loath to revise an interpretation of the Consti-
tution, the rule lingers on long after it should have been revised. Less
confusion would result if courts forging new constitutional rights would ini-
tially declare that those rights have constitutional status. Rules created by
legitimate exercises of the supervisory power, those rules that merely enforce
already established constitutional rights, could then be subjected to more
rapid and responsive shaping over time by the Congress, the state legisla-
tures, and the courts themselves.
Most jurists and commentators do not doubt that the above three
strains of supervisory power, though often misnamed, exist. 39 Others disa-
gree, however. Chief justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Payner,
stated that "[o]rderly government under our system of separate powers calls
for internal self-restraint and discipline in each Branch; this Court has no
general supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch, as it
has with respect to the federal courts."' 4 Does the Chief Justice mean to say
that the Court, in its effort to promote the Bill of Rights, cannot develop
rules of enforcement against government agents if those agents happen to
work in the executive branch? If the answer is yes, how does he justify the
exclusionary rule when the defendant does indeed have standing?
4 '
The Chief Justice may have had in mind the fourth possible exercise of
the supervisory power. This fourth category comprises cases in which courts
invent a rule which does not flow from, and does not purport to enforce, the
Constitution, and is not meant to improve the accuracy of the judicial pro-
cess. The rule is simply a judicial response to distasteful official conduct.
42
38. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
39. See Hill, supra note 33; Note, The &Spervv7 Power of the Federal Cozwts, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 1656 (1963). See also note 56 infia.
40. 447 U.S. at 737 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
41. Perhaps he does not. The Chief Justice has been a steadfast critic of the rule in any
form since long before he joined the Supreme Court. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?,
14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964). Shortly after becoming Chief Justice, he again attacked the rule
and proposed in some detail a statutory alternative. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Hill, supra note 33, at 199.
1981)
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Here lies a real danger of boundless judicial lawmaking. The apprehension
of an uncircumscribed power of adjudication by judicial discretion is well-
founded. To date, fortunately, few if any courts have gone this far.
43
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS AN EXERCISE OF
THE SUPERVISORY POWER
The effect of the exclusionary rule often hinges on the analysis of its
purpose and on the power of the courts to apply it. Aside from the above
outline, some authorities have advanced a type of supervisory power based
on what may be called the judicial integrity theory. 44 With regard to the
exclusionary rule, the argument is that illegally seized evidence must be ex-
cluded to protect the integrity of the judiciary, by preventing the courts from
becoming "accomplices" 45 to wrongful official acts. This rationale ap-
pears appealing, for it promotes the illusion that the rule does not interfere
with the prerogatives of other branches. As in civil litigation, the courts
merely withhold their facilities from those with "unclean hands."
46
The case which created the exclusionary rule4 7 was based on the judi-
cial integrity theory, and it was not until about the time the rule was applied
to the states that the deterrence theory appeared. 48 Presumably, the shift in
reasoning occurred because a theory of supervisory power exclusion that is
defended as necessary to maintain judicial integrity is quickly met at the
43. Id. at 200. Justice Frankfurter's broad language in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) is the nearest precedent for exercise of this fourth type of supervisory power. There he
spoke of the need to observe "canons of decency and fairness" as a due process requirement. Id.
at 169. By basing his holding on due process grounds it is evident the decision was actually a
constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, any precedential value of Rochin is diminished be-
cause it was decided before the exclusionary rule was imposed on the states by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). After Mapp, a Roch'n situation could be decided on the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule without resorting to due process.
Later, in Hampden v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), Justice Rehnquist asserted for
the Court that due process is relevant "only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right of the defendant." Id. at 490 (emphasis in original). Justices Powell and
Blackmun were unwilling to join in such a rigid approach. They suggested that under some
circumstances, due process principles or the supervisory power could bar conviction. Id. at 495
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun apparently thought Payner presented those circum-
stances, for he dissented in Paner. Justice Powell apparently disagreed, for he wrote the Payner
opinion for the Court.
44. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S.
1, 14 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943).
45. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 345 (1943).
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Some writers have embraced the judicial integrity theory but only as a pretense for the
rapid development of constitutional law. See, e.g., Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1666-67 (1963). Those writers would have the courts promulgate ten-
tative rules, which, if met with public acceptance, would become constitutional rights of due
process. Such an approach has at least three defects. First, the process would overtly
subordinate thejudiciary to the cry of popular opinion. Second, it is not certain that the growth
of constitutional law is or need be slow. Third, it does not follow that if the supervisory power is
to protect the integrity of the judiciary, then the principles it produces should become constitu-
tional rights of due process. The defendant, not the judiciary, is the object of due process. Any
benefits accruing to defendants out of a system designed to protect the judiciary would be hap-
penstance.
47. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
48. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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state level with the response that state courts are free to establish their own
standards of integrity. Federal courts lack the power to impose subjective
levels of integrity upon state courts.
49
The judicial integrity rationale has always been unsound. Permitting
adjudication after official misconduct no more makes the court an accom-
plice to the misconduct than permitting the defendant to state his case
makes the court an accomplice to his crime. By closing the courthouse doors
when confronted with official misconduct, the judiciary does more than
avoid complicity; it affirmatively stymies law enforcement. It is a fantasy to
pretend that the judiciary, merely because it is a separate branch, is not an
integral and necessary component of law enforcement. Courts that simply
close their doors wrongfully decline to perform the function that is theirs
alone. In effect, they pass on the merits of the prosecution. 50
The judicial integrity theory notwithstanding, the exclusionary rule is
best justified as an exercise of substantive supervisory power. 5 1 It enforces a
constitutional directive; it is not a constitutional directive in itself. Mapp v.
Ohio, 52 according to some commentators, concluded the opposite-that the
rule was more than a product of the supervisory power. 53 If the rule is not
compelled by the Constitution, how could it be imposed on the states? The
answer requires consideration of the peculiar genesis of Mapp.
The court in the earlier case of Wolf v. Colorado5 4 reaffirmed that the rule
was not constitutionally mandated and, therefore, the states were free to en-
force the fourth amendment with methods of their choice. Unfortunately, in
the interim between Wolf and Mapp, most states failed to devise any enforce-
ment methods whatsoever. Exasperated by state indifference, the Mapp
Court finally insisted that the states adopt the rule. Analyzed in this light, it
is apparent that the exclusionary rule per se is not necessary to the fourth
amendment. Rather, it is necessary that the amendment be enforced. Wolf
appeared to issue a warning, which the states ignored, of the upcoming
Mapp decision.55 In summary: (1) Wolf necessarily read into the fourth
amendment a constitutional requirement of enforcement; (2) as an exercise
of its supervisory power, the federal courts chose to enforce the amendment
with the exclusionary rule; (3) the states were allowed to develop their own
enforcement provisions; and (4) Mapp imposed the enforcement provision
with which it was acquainted, the exclusionary rule, on the states when the
states failed to develop their own effective enforcement. The plurality opin-
ions of Mapp are garbled, but commentators and subsequent cases have sup-
ported the foregoing analysis of Wolf and Mapp .56
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. See Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932); Hill, supra note 33, at 205-07.
51. Se. text accompanying note 38 supra.
52. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. Allen, Federalism and he Foath Amenfhent A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
54. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. Set id.
56. Most of the commentators on the exclusionary rule have debated the merits of the rule
itself, not the power of the court to apply it. Geller, supra note 37; Burger, supra note 41; Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule tn Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665 (1970). It is noteworthy
that Judge Friendly remarked that no majority of the Supreme Court has ever held that the
19811
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IV. THE SUPERVISORY POWER IN PAYNER
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court and Justice Marshall's dissent are
founded on different premises. Justice Marshall based his dissent on the ju-
dicial integrity theory,57 a theory upon which a majority of the Court has
not relied in a decade or more.58 Accordingly, standing is irrelevant to Jus-
tice Marshall because the taint on the judiciary is identical whether the evi-
dence was illegally seized from the defendant or from a stranger. The
defendant is the lucky beneficiary of a rule designed to protect the courts.
This comment rejects the judicial integrity rationale but, if embraced, Jus-
tice Marshall's analysis follows logically.
fourth amendment compels the exclusionary rule. United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting). Since Judge Friendly's 1968 Soyka opinion the Supreme Court
has, if anything retreated still further from any lingering notion that the rule is constitutionally
compelled. Shortly after Soyka, Justice White said for the Court that "[nleither [Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)] nor any others
hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Later the rule was called by
Justice Powell a "judicially created remedy . . . rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Justice Blackmun's
opening sentence for the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) referred to "the
judicially created exclusionary rule .... " Id. at 434.
If the rule is not constitutionally compelled, it seems likely that it is a product of the super-
visory power, as broadly defined by Professor Hill and in this Comment. Hill, supra note 33, at
193. Another interesting explanation is that the exclusionary rule and other subsidiary rules not
required by the Constitution comprise the "Constitutional common law." Monaghan, Constitu-
htonal Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975). But see Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidertng the
Constitutinal Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). Professor Monaghan's Constitu-
tional common law differs from this comment's procedural and substantive supervisory power
mainly in name. The point is that a body of rules exists, which is specifically mandated by the
Constitution, but which can be imposed on the states to enforce the Constitution.
57. 447 U.S. at 747-48.
58. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra. One would probably have to look all the way
back to McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), to find a Supreme Court decision rest-
ing exclusively on the judicial integrity rationale. The most lucid descriptions of the theory are
in the dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). Cases decided shortly before and after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), relied on
both the judicial integrity and deterrence theories, see, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 106
(1960), or principally on the deterrence theory, see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965). Justice White, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), declared that "[t]he
necessity for [standing] was not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim
of the rule." Id. at 174 (citing Linkletter and Elkins). The judicial integrity theory was alto-
gether abandoned in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). "For the first time, the
Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of the rule to insure that the
judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct." Id. at
360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (citing Calan-
dra). See Oaks, Studying the Exrcustonag Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 669
(1970).
One pair of writers has contrasted the majority and dissenting Calandra opinions as based
on the "fragmentary" and "unitary" models of government respectively. Schrock & Welsh, Up
from Calandra: The Exclusionay Rule as a ConsttutionalRequtrement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 255-60
(1974). Under the fragmentary model, the judiciary is seen as distinct from the prosecution and
law enforcement. Since the court's function is to find the truth, the out-of-court activities of
Government officials are immaterial. Illegally obtained evidence is admitted for its probative
value without approval or condemnation of the means by which it was obtained. Id. at 255-56.
By contrast, under the unitary model, the court is a part of the government. A wrong commit-
ted by Government agents becomes a wrong by the judiciary if the court permits the prosecu-
tion to enjoy the fruits of the wrong. Id. at 257-60. For an answer to the unitary model, see note
50 supra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court continues the
trend which values the rule primarily for its deterrent function.5 9 The exclu-
sion of often highly probative evidence is the price paid to deny government
agents the incentive to violate the fourth amendment. The price is paid only
when the need to deter outweighs the general need to admit all relevant
evidence. 6° The Court might have paused for pedagogical reasons to draw
the line between constitutional rights and the supervisory power, but was
correct in stating that "[tlhe values assigned to the competing interests do
not change because the court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the fourth amendment."
'6'
This comment has asserted that the exclusionary rule is and always was
a product of the supervisory power, despite its disguises.62 Ironically, the
district court circumvented the exclusionary rule standing requirement by
asserting outright the same authority that covertly created the rule: the su-
pervisory power. Analyzed in this perspective, the district court's supervi-
sory power argument, which was but one of several grounds for its holding,
must collapse. Moreover, Justice Powell's arguments that the competing in-
terests are unchanged by a supervisory power analysis and that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule "serves precisely the same purposes"' 63 are ob-
viously accurate. The only confusion is semantics.
Payner is an example of a district court that, faced with particularly
reprehensible official misconduct, avoided the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule and its attendant standing requirement by means of a trick in termi-
nology. The Supreme Court Justices, except perhaps the Chief Justice,64 did
not seem to dispute that the supervisory power exists. Justice Powell, though
he may narrow the scope of the power more than the dissenters would, none-
theless, conceded its existence. 65 The disagreement was whether the power,
whatever its name, should be exercised when an illegal search and seizure
violates rights other than the defendant's. In other words, the issue was the
familiar one of standing. The majority refused to permit new wording to
influence old law. Justice Marshall for the dissenters saw a need to carve out
59. Justice Powell said that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule ... is applied in
part 'to protect the integrity of the court rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
defendant .... ' " 447 U.S. at 736 n.8 (quoting Justice Marshall's dissent in Payner, 447 U.S. at
746) (emphasis in the original). The judicial integrity interest apparently did not tip the bal-
ance of competing interests appreciably, because Justice Powell went on to state that "the inter-
est in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such conduct is outweighed by the societal
interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact." Id. The majority's footnoted
judicial integrity discussion may have been an afterthought to meet the dissent's argument, or
the majority may genuinely believe that the need to present probative evidence justifies tainting
the Court by making it an "accomplice" to the Government's misconduct. The majority's argu-
ment would have been more persuasive had it forthrightly disavowed the judicial integrity the-
ory, as in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See discussion in note 58 supra.
Oddly, Justice Powell cites Calandnz while also acknowledging the judicial integrity theory.
60. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
61. 447 U.S. at 736.
62. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
63. 447 U.S. at 736 n.8.
64. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
65. 447 U.S. at 736 n.8.
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an exception to the old law of standing. Neither opinion directly confronts
the rationale of the standing requirement.
The modern view, however, to which this comment conforms, is that
the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right. It is merely a judicially
created means to enforce the Constitution. 66 The defendant, therefore, does
not assert his constitutional right to exclusion of the evidence. Rather, the
defendant demands that the judiciary duly exercise its commitment to deter
illegal searches and seizures. The deterrence is nonexistent absent the pun-
ishment of exclusion. Neither "standing" nor the shibboleth of "personal
constitutional rights" 67 can justify restriction of the exclusionary rule to cases
where the search violated the fourth amendment rights of the defendant
rather than those of a stranger. The balance of competing interests should
not shift toward the prosecution when the defendant lacks standing, because
the rights of the particular defendant are not elements of the interests that
are balanced. Rather, the principal interest for exclusion is the need to deter
illegal searches generally. A rule for deterrence, unlike a rule for compensa-
tion, operates prospectively only, and for the benefit of an undetermined
class. It is irrelevant that the victim was not the defendant because the pur-
pose of the deterrence rule is to prevent future wrongs against other potential
victims, not to compensate for a past wrong against the present victim. To
withhold the exclusionary rule from all defendants except those who are vic-
tims deters illegal searches of defendants only. Limited application means
limited deterrence. It seems that the rest of the public is equally entitled to
protection by deterrence.68
CONCLUSION
Application of the unpopular and expensive exclusionary rule69 is re-
stricted by the rule that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search is
not excluded unless the defendant's constitutional rights were violated. The
restrictive rule has been, and probably will continue to be, inaccurately
called a rule of standing. 70 Whatever the rule's name, the restriction bears
no rational relation to the purpose of the rule or to the source of the power
66. See note 56 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
68. See Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seieure, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
342, 352-66 (1967).
69. The rule seems about to be swallowed by exceptions contrived to limit its application.
The independent source exception, which developed almost immediately after the rule itself,
permits the use of illegally seized evidence if the Government can show it would have obtained
the evidence through independent legal means. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The attenuation exception provides that fruits of an illegal search may be
admissible if the connection between the offered evidence and the illegal search is sufficiently
"attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Illegally seized evidence may be used before a grand jury, United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974); for purposes of impeachment, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); in a
parole revocation hearing, United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1975); and for pur-
poses of sentencing, United States v. Schipan, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dented, 401
U.S. 983 (1971). Justice Marshall views the Court's recent decisions as an orchestrated "ero-
sion" of the exclusionary rule. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
70. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
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which created the rule. What is worse, the standing restriction invites delib-
erate official violations of a third party's fourth amendment rights, which is
exactly what happened in Payner. It is difficult to find logic or justice in a
judicial system which suppresses evidence gathered from a technically and
accidentally illegal search, such as when a warrant is defective, but admits
evidence flowing from a grossly and deliberately illegal search, such as when
government agents commit larceny.
Until courts or legislatures find substitutes for the exclusionary rule,
7 1
such paradoxes will persist. A broad application of the rule will continue to
discourage fourth amendment violations. Payner, however, removes the su-
pervisory power from the district courts' collection of devices with which to
avoid the standing requirement, at least when the government acts are no
more serious than larceny. It remains to be seen whether government con-
duct will descend still further to embrace worse crimes. 72 Unless other
fourth amendment remedies are fashioned, Payner may encourage another
step in that direction.
Glenn Kirwan Beaton
71. Because the rule is not constitutionally mandated, there is no constitutional objection
to replacing it. For a complete overview of the other remedies proposed, see Geller, supra note
37, at 689-722.
72. It has been suggested that the severity of the fourth amendment violation should be
material when determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule. See Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 609-10 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Comment, Fruit of the Poironous Tree - A
Pleafor ReleoaniCnrira, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1153 (1967).
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